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ROOSEVELT V. BISHOP: BALANCING 
LOCAL INTERESTS WITH STATE EQUITY 
INTERESTS IN SCHOOL FINANCING* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
By almost any measure, education is the primary service 
provided by state and local governments in the United States. In 
the 1954 case, Brown u. Board of Education, the court said: 
[T]oday, education is perhaps the most important func-
tion of state and local governments. Compulsory school 
attendance laws and the great expenditures for educa-
tion both demonstrate our recognition of the importance 
of education to our democratic society. It is required in 
the performance of our most basic public responsibilities, 
even service in the armed forces. It is the very foundation 
of good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in 
awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him 
for later professional training, and in helping him to 
adjust normally to his environment. In these days, it is 
doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to 
succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an educa-
tion. Such an opportunity, where the state has under-
taken to provide it, is a right which must be available to 
all on equal terms. 1 
Almost five times as much money is spent on education by local 
governments than for police and fire protection.2 Expenditures 
for public elementary and secondary schools have varied be-
tween three and a half and four percent of gross national prod-
uct (GNP) since 1970, and nearly forty percent of local govern-
ment spending.3 Furthermore, perceptions of local schools have 
a significant influence on location choices of both individuals 
1. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). 
2. RONALD C. FISHER, STATE AND LOCAL PuBLIC FINANCE 371 (1993). 
3. FISHER at 371. 
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and businesses, thus directly influencing property values in 
specific locations.4 
Currently, school districts are funded primarily through 
state-specific combinations of state and local funding, with fed-
eral funding playing a relatively minor role. Prior to the 1970's, 
local governments provided more than half of the funding while 
on average state governments provided forty percent.5 However, 
during the 1970's, their relative positions were reversed until 
the state governments were providing over fifty percent of the 
funding while the local government share decreased. This rever-
sal came about because of several lawsuits requiring greater 
equalization of funding between school districts. As a result of 
the lawsuits, the states would distribute their funding to the 
school districts based on a formula designed to equitably distrib-
ute the funds-a method not available to the districts. Thus, to 
obtain equalization between districts, a greater proportion of the 
funding needed to come from the state government rather than 
the local. 
This Note presents some of the difficulties in addressing 
school funding equity issues. Part II of this Note provides an 
overview of school funding and the background for the 1994 
Arizona decision in Roosevelt v. Bishop.6 Part Ill briefly recites 
the facts and reasoning behind the Arizona Supreme Court's 
ruling in Roosevelt. Part N analyzes the Roosevelt decision in 
light of some of the major policy issues surrounding school fund-
ing equity. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. Overall Background of School Funding Cases 
Of the several school funding cases filed in the early 1970's, 
the first one to reach the U.S. Supreme Court was San Antonio 
Independent School District v. Rodriguez.7 In its decision, the 
Court held first, that there was no federal right to education, 
and second, that differences in financial status between districts 
4. FISHER at 371. 
5. Id. at 373. 
6. Roosevelt Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 66 v. Bishop, 877 P.2d 806, 808 (Ariz. 
1994). 
7. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
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did not indicate poverty was a suspect classification requiring 
strict scrutiny. However, the Court did say that "[t]he need is 
apparent for reform in tax systems which may well have relied 
too long and too heavily on the local property tax .... But the 
ultimate solutions must come from the lawmakers and from the 
democratic pressures of those who elect them."8 Since Rodriguez, 
school funding cases have remained in the state courts, where 
the majority of the states have considered the meaning of state 
constitutional requirements for education.9 While some of the 
state courts have found their funding systems adequate, more 
and more courts are finding the funding discrepancies between 
school districts unconstitutional under an emerging state consti-
tutional right to education.10 
The earliest of these state cases took place in California. In 
Serrano v. Priest, the California Supreme Court applied a nar-
row, measurable standard-the equality of dollar inputs per 
student, thus emphasizing discrimination on the basis of 
8. San Antonio at 58-9. 
9. E.g., Pinto v. Alabama Coalition for Equity, Inc., 662 So. 2d 894 (Ala. 1995); 
Matanuska-Susitna Borough Sch. Dist. v. State, 931 P.2d 391 (Alaska 1997); Roosevelt 
Elementary Sch. Dist. Number 66 v. Bishop, 877 P.2d 806 (Ariz. 1994); Dupree v. Alma 
Sch. Dist., 651 S.W.2d 90 (Ark. 1988); Serrano v. Priest , 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971); 
Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929 (Cal. 1977); Lujan v. Colorado State Bd. of Educ., 649 
P.2d 1005 (Colo. 1982); Horton v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 359 (Conn. 1977); McDaniel v. 
Thomas, 285 S.E.2d 156 (Ga. 1981); Thompson v. Engelking, 537 P.2d 635 (Idaho 1975); 
Committee for Educational Rights v. Edgar, 672 N.E.2d 1178 (Ill. 1996); Rose v. Council 
for Better Educ., Inc. 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989); Hornbeck v. Somerset County Bd. of 
Educ., 458 A.2d 758 (Md. 1983); McDuffy v. Secretary of the Executive Office of 
Education, 615 N.E.2d 516 (Mass. 1993); Milliken v. Green, 212 N.W.2d 711 (Mich. 
1973); Committee for Educational Equality v. State, 878 S.W.2d 446 (Minn. 1994); 
Helena Elementary Sch. Dist. No.1 v. State, 769 P.2d 684 (Mont. 1989), opinion 
amended by 784 P.2d 412 (Mont. 1990); Gould v. Orr, 506 N.W.2d 349 (Neb. 1993); 
Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273 (N.J.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1138 (1973); Board of 
Educ. v. Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d 359 (N.Y. 1982), appeal dismissed, 459 U.S. 1138 (1983); 
Britt v. North Carolina State Bd. of Educ., 357 S.E.2d 432, 435-36 (N.C. Ct. App.), cert. 
denied, 361 S.E.2d 71 (N.E. 1987); Bismarck Public Sch. Dist. #1 v. State, 511 N.W.2d 
247 (N.D. 1994); DeRolph v. State, 678 N.E.2d 886 (Ohio 1997); Fair Sch. Fin. Council 
of Okla., Inc. v. State, 746 P.2d 1135 (Okla. 1987); Olsen v. State, 554 P.2d 139 (Or. 
1976); Danson v. Casey, 399 A.2d 360 (Pa. 1979); Woonsocket v. Sundlun v. Pawtucket, 
662 A.2d 40 (R.I. 1995); Tennessee Small Sch. Sys. v. McWherter, 851 S.W.2d 139 
(Tenn. 1993); Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989); 
Brigham v. State, 692 A.2d 384 (Va. 1997); Seattle Sch. Dist. v. State, 585 P.2d 71 
(Wash. 1978); Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859 (W.Va. 1979); Buse v. Smith, 247 N.W.2d 
141 (Wis. 1976); Washakie County Sch. Dist. v. Hei'!!chler, 606 P.2d 310 (Wyo.), cert. 
denied, 449 U.S. 824 (1980). 
10. Allen W. Hubsch, The Emerging Right to Education under State Constitutional 
Law, 65 TEMP. L. REV. 1325 (1992). 
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wealth-and allowed a successful challenge under the equal 
protection clause of the Federal Fourteenth Amendment on the 
basis of classification according to wealth. 11 The court held that 
under the California State Constitution education was a funda-
mental right and thus, school district wealth differences create a 
suspect classification. Since the state did not have a compelling 
reason for maintaining the inequities in the finance plan, it was 
held to be unconstitutional. 12 Six years later, relitigating the 
same issue, the California Supreme Court again held that the 
schools' financing systems violated equal protection provisions. 
However, this time the systems violated the equal protection 
provisions of the California State Constitution rather than those 
of the Federal ConstitutionP Fifteen years after the Serrano I 
decision, on the fourth case addressing the same issue, the Cali-
fornia state appellate court declared that the state legislature 
had sufficiently met the standard of fiscal neutrality through its 
good faith efforts. 14 As a result of this ruling, and the ruling of a 
similar case in New Jersey/5 many of the state legislatures be-
gan to revise their school funding systems. The most common 
method of doing so was to raise the percentage of educational 
funds coming from state money, thus lowering the percentage of 
contribution from local funds. 
B. Methods of Financing Elementary and Secondary Education 
Although there is no single formula which states use to fi-
nance elementary and secondary education, there are two meth-
ods commonly used, either alone or in combination with each 
other, to determine the level of state funding that each school 
district will receive. The first method is a foundation aid pro-
gram that requires a basic dollar amount per pupil and is per-
haps a way of reducing the amount for richer districts.16 This 
was the method commonly used before the 1977 Serrano I deci-
sion. Since it makes no attempt to equalize resources across 
districts, many of the states, after Serrano I began to use, at 
least to some extent, the second method. This method guaran-
11. Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971) [Hereinafter Serrano I]. 
12. Id. 
13. Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929 (Cal. 1977) [Hereinafter Serrano II]. 
14. Serrano v. Priest, 226 Cal. Rptr. 584 (Cal. 1986) [Hereinafter Serrano IV). 
15. Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273 (N.J. 1973). 
16. FISHER, supra note 3, at 377. 
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tees a certain tax base for each district in the state, which uses 
state grants to "match" the funds supplied through local taxes, 
thus reducing the price of education to the school districts. 17 The 
main result of the second method reduces the local property 
taxes, without necessarily increasing educational spending.18 
C. Background of School Equity in Arizona 
In Arizona, as in most of the other states, financial equity 
between school districts became an issue in the early 1970's. 
This was about the time the Arizona case, Shofstall v. Hollins, 19 
was filed. Shofstall alleged that inequity between school dis-
tricts was unconstitutional. Meanwhile, the Arizona State Legis-
lature revised the financing provision for the public schools in 
1973, effective July 1, 1974. Thus, by the time Shofstall v. 
Hollins came before the Arizona Supreme Court, the Court said 
that the recent legislative action made it unnecessary to exam-
ine the alleged defects in the "old" financing system. However, 
the court discussed the basic contentions of the plaintiffs and 
held that the state constitution established a fundamental right 
of education for children between six and twenty-one. The court 
also held that a school financing system meeting the educational 
mandates of the constitution "need otherwise be only rational, 
reasonable and neither discriminatory nor capricious."20 Thus, 
the court established a presumption that if the school financing 
system provided for an education that was uniform, free, avail-
able to persons between six and twenty-one, and open a mini-
mum of six months out of the year, then it had a rational and 
reasonable basis, and would not be deemed unconstitutional 
unless it was demonstrated to be discriminatory or capricious. 
Twenty-one years later, in Roosevelt v. Bishop, the Arizona Su-
preme Court held the school financing system to be unconstitu-
tional under this standard. 
17. FISHER, supra note 3, at 378. 
18. ld. at 384. See also AUSTIN D. SWANSON AND RICHARD A. KING, SCHOOL 
FINANCE: ITS ECONOMICS AND POLITICS (1991) (an additional description of the policy 
implications of financing methods). 
19. Shofstall v. Hollins, 515 P.2d 590 (Ariz. 1973). 
20. Shoftstall at 592. 
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III. DISCUSSION OF ROOSEVELT V. BISHOP 
A. Facts of the Case 
[1996 
The circumstances and facts of Roosevelt v. Bishop are simi-
lar to those of many school funding cases-school districts with 
lower funding and parents with children in those school districts 
file equity suits against the state board of education or 
superintendent of education. Roosevelt was somewhat unique, 
however, because it was specifically concerned with the quality 
of the facilities available to the elementary and high school stu-
dents in Arizona. For example, some of the districts had excel-
lent facilities including "indoor swimming pools, a domed sta-
dium, science laboratories, television studios, well stocked li-
braries, satellite dishes, and extensive computer systems."21 On 
the other hand, some districts had facilities that were "unsafe, 
unhealthy, and in violation of building, fire, and safety codes."22 
Other districts used "dirt lots for playgrounds."23 In addition, 
there were schools "without libraries, science laboratories, com-
puter rooms, art programs, gymnasiums, and auditoriums."24 
Recognizing the funding disparity between districts, the districts 
with lower funding, in conjunction with parents and children 
from those districts, filed an action against the state and the 
board of education seeking a declaration that the existing statu-
tory scheme for financing public education was unconstitutional. 
Prior to the lawsuit, the amount of funding, and thus the 
quality of the facilities, was directly proportional to the value of 
the real property in the district. This scheme was not easy to 
understand. First, the base-level funding need of each district 
was calculated by multiplying the number of students in the 
district by an arbitrary state-wide dollar amount per pupil. 25 
Next, the district's required contribution was calculated by mul-
tiplying the district's total assessed property value by an arbi-
trary dollar amount that each district was expected to raise from 
a statewide local primary property tax. 26 If the second figure was 
less than the first, then the state made up the difference. If the 
21. Roosevelt at 808. 
22. Id. 
23. Id. 
24. ld. at 806. 
25. ARIZ. REV. STAT. §15-943. 
26. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 15-971. 
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second figure was greater than the first, then the district was 
not entitled to any state funds and it was not required to send 
the surplus to the state educational fund coffers. This formula 
provided for the maintenance and operations budgets of the 
Arizona school districts, ensuring that each district had at least 
a roughly equal base amount of funding per pupil, although 
there was some disagreement as to whether the base level was 
adequate.27 
The Ari-
zona formula 
(see Figure 1) 
was a combina-
tion of both 
methods dis-
cussed above 
in Section II. 
The first part 
of the formula 
was most simi-
lar to the foun-
dation aid 
system be-
Figure 1 
G = (S * B) - (P * E) 
G = state grant to district 
S = number of students 
B = base state-wide fixed dollar amount/pupil 
P =district's total assessed property value 
E = fixed amount each district is expected to 
raise from property taxes. 
cause it provided a minimal base for each student to which local 
revenue supplements may be added. The second part was most 
similar to the matching method because it guaranteed a certain 
tax base to each district. Under this system, the state funded 
45% ofthe educational expenses, the local districts 45%, and the 
federal government and counties 10%.28 
In contrast, funds for school construction were raised primar-
ily through the sale of district bonds repaid through a secondary 
property tax levy,29 which were subject to voter approval and 
therefore, based solely on available property wealth and the 
willingness of taxpayers to pay higher taxes. For capital 
improvements, each district had a budgeted amount to meet 
those needs. However, the districts could use their capital funds 
for maintenance and operations if their maintenance and opera-
27. Memorandum from Lisa Graham Keegan, Superintendent of Public 
Instruction, to Residents of Arizona. (January 2, 1997) (on file with author). 
28. Roosevelt at 810. 
29. !d. 
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tions budgets were insufficient.30 When that happened, the dis-
tricts did not have the funds necessary to replace any capital 
facilities that deteriorated beyond repair. 
As the funding was dependent upon the assessed value of 
the property in a given district, the districts with the best 
funded schools were not necessarily found in districts with a 
higher income population. Instead, they were the districts with 
the most taxable commercial property. For example, the Ruth 
Fisher Elementary School District had an assessed property 
valuation per pupil of $5.8 million because that was where the 
Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station was located. On the 
other hand, the San Carlos Unified District had an assessed 
valuation per pupil of $749 because there was little commercial 
property in Gila County where the district is located. Only four 
percent of the land in Gila County was available for commercial 
or individual use.31 Because of the extreme variation in assessed 
property values, it was impossible for the property poor districts 
to generate the same amount of money as the property rich dis-
tricts, no matter how high their tax rate was. One example of 
this is that in 1989-90, the composite tax rate of one district was 
$4.37 per $100 of assessed value, while that of another district 
was $.11 per $100 of assessed value.32 In other words, those 
districts rich in commercial property, regardless of the popula-
tion's level of income, had the potential to generate significantly 
more money to fund their school districts than those districts 
poor in commercial property. 
In addition to commercial property valuation, school funding 
was also affected by demographic factors such as income and 
student population. One example of this was the Madison and 
Roosevelt Elementary School Districts. Both districts had simi-
lar distributions of commercial and residential property, but 
Madison was largely middle income while Roosevelt was largely 
lower income.33 The result was that residential property values 
differed significantly, thus affecting the assessed property valua-
tion and the school funding. Furthermore, Roosevelt had a 
larger number of students, thus requiring a smaller amount of 
money to be spread among a larger number of students. "Madi-
30. Roosevelt at 810. 
31. ld. 
32. ld. at 809. 
33. Id. 
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son's assessed value per pupil [was] $130,778 while Roosevelt's 
assessed value per pupil [was] only $18,293."34 Commercial 
property valuation, income level, and student population all 
played important roles in Roosevelt in contributing to the differ-
ences in funding between the various school districts in Arizona. 
None of these facts were disputed by the parties, and fur-
thermore, in deposition, C. Diane Bishop, the Superintendent of 
Public Instruction, acknowledged that a district's property value 
largely determined its ability to fund capital investment. Bishop 
also agreed that the quality of education children receive should 
be the same regardless of whether they live in rich or poor dis-
tricts,35 indicating her dissatisfaction with the current scheme of 
educational funding. 
In Roosevelt, the plaintiffs made two separate state constitu-
tional arguments that the Arizona educational financing system 
was unconstitutional. First, they argued under Article XI of the 
Arizona Constitution, the education clause, that education is a 
fundamental right. Additionally, "the school finance system 
violates the state equal protection clause (the privileges or im-
munities clause) because it discriminates against children and 
denies them equal educational opportunities because of where 
they live."36 In response, the defendants argued that under the 
court's 1973 Shofstall decision, acknowledging education as a 
fundamental right and upholding the existing financing system 
using the rational basis test, the districts' privileges and immu-
nities argument was foreclosed. 37 Therefore, the districts had 
failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, and 
the state was entitled to summary judgment. 
The second constitutional argument that the plaintiffs made 
was that under Article XI, §§1, 8, 9, and 10 of the Arizona Con-
stitution, the legislature was required to "maintain a general 
and uniform public school system and finance it by general and 
special appropriation."38 In response, the state argued that the 
Arizona public school system was not within the scope of article 
XI, §10 and that funding a general and uniform public school 
system was the school districts' responsibility, not that of the 
34. Roosevelt at 809. 
35. Id. 
36. Id. at 811. 
37. ld. 
38. Id. at 813. 
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state.39 Again, relying on Shofstall, the state argued that "as 
long as the framework of the system [was] general and uniform, 
the substance of that system need not be."40 
The district court agreed with the defendants on the first 
argument that, as a matter oflaw, the districts had not stated a 
claim under the Arizona Constitution, but it agreed with the 
districts that the statutory scheme was responsible for the dis-
parities in facilities between the school districts. 41 The districts 
then filed an appeal in the Arizona Court of Appeals and simul-
taneously filed a petition for an order transferring the case to 
the Arizona Supreme Court. Because of the importance of the 
issues-requiring an interpretation of the Arizona Constitution 
and possibly overruling a prior decision42-the case was trans-
ferred to the Arizona Supreme Court which then reversed the 
lower court's decision and remanded the case.43 
B. Arizona Supreme Court Decision 
1. Majority opinion 
The Arizona Supreme Court addressed "whether a statutory 
financing scheme for public education that is itself the cause of 
gross disparities in school facilities complies with the 'general 
and uniform' requirement of Article XI, §1 of the Arizona Consti-
tution."44 The court eventually held that a financing scheme that 
caused gross disparities in school facilities did not comply with 
the constitutional "general and uniform" requirements. The 
state could delegate some of its authority to the school districts 
to help finance public education, but it could not delegate its 
responsibility under the Arizona Constitution to produce a gen-
eral and uniform financing scheme for educational funding.45 
The court also found that while the case dealt solely with the 
capital disparities between districts, these disparities were "sim-
ply the first symptoms of a system-wide problem."46 
39. Roosevelt at 813. 
40. Id. 
41. Id. at 808. 
42. ARIZ. R. Crv. APP. P. RULE 19(a). 
43. Roosevelt at 808. 
44. Id. at 808. 
45. Id. at 813. 
46. Id. at 810. 
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The court, although recognizing precedent from Shofstall 
deeming education a fundamental right under the Arizona Con-
stitution, avoided analyzing the school funding system under 
the equal protection provision. Instead, the court said that 
"where the constitution specifically addresses the particular 
subject at issue, we must address that specific provision first."47 
By analyzing the system under the education clause rather than 
the equal protection clause, the Roosevelt court avoided resolv-
ing the conundrum presented in Shofstall where the court held 
that education was a fundamental right, thus implying a com-
pelling state interest (strict scrutiny) test, but then applied a 
rational basis test.48 After examining the history surrounding 
the adoption of the education clause, the court concluded that 
the "general and uniform" requirement would only be met if 
"[f]unding mechanisms ... provide sufficient funds to educate 
children on substantially equal terms."49 "Gross disparities" 
resulting from a financing system would render the system un-
constitutional. 50 
2. Points of disagreement 
a. Concurrence. While the majority opmwn avoided ad-
dressing the issue under the equal protection clause, Chief Jus-
tice Feldman was not averse to doing so in his concurring opin-
ion. Using an equal protection analysis, he indicated that be-
cause the statutes infringed upon a fundamental right per 
Shofstall, that strict scrutiny, or the compelling state interest 
test, should apply. Under that test, he would have decided that 
the funding system resulted in gross disparities and was unnec-
essary to serve the compelling state interest in preserving local 
control over education. 51 Feldman also indicated that he felt the 
court had an obligation to the legislature, since it would now 
have to create a new financing system, to explain 'just what the 
constitution requires and what we [the court] mean when we 
state that the system must provide an adequate education."52 To 
do that, Feldman analyzed several Arizona statutes and two 
47. Roosevelt at 811, n.3. 
48. Shofstall v. Hollins, 515 P.2d 590 (Ariz. 1973); See also Roosevelt at 811. 
49. Roosevelt at 814. 
50. Id. at 814-15. 
51. Roosevelt at 816-818. 
52. Id. at 819. 
234 B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL [1996 
Washington cases by analogy, finally concluding that the Board 
was required to prescribe a minimum course of study and that 
the legislature was required to put into effect a financing system 
that would provide for facilities and equipment that would en-
able each district to give their students the opportunity to meet 
those minimum standards.53 
b. Dissent. The dissent, written by Vice Chief Justice 
Moeller and joined by Justice Corcoran, emphasized local auton-
omy. The two dissenters argued that the disparities in funding 
could be a result of political or economic decisions made by the 
individual districts54 and indicated that they would have fol-
lowed the U.S. Supreme Court's example in Rodriguez, leaving 
school funding decisions up to the legislature.55 Vice Chief Jus-
tice Moeller argued that the legislature, in creating a school 
financing system, would certainly have considered that the cur-
rent system made it more politically or economically difficult for 
some districts to raise as much money as other districts.56 The 
dissenters further argued that equalizing capital funding be-
tween the districts would not solve the problem nor provide 
equal educational opportunities because of the "myriad other 
factors" at work besides the money spent to produce quality 
education.57 They were also afraid that by limiting the funding 
authority of local districts, the court's decision "eviscerate[s] 
effective local control," despite the fact that both the majority 
opinion and the concurrence acknowledged the historical signifi-
cance oflocal controP8 
IV. PUBLIC POLICY ANALYSIS 
A. State-wide Equity or Local Autonomy 
The fundamental policy issue in school financing concerns 
balancing the equity interests of the state with the districts' 
interest in local control. On the one hand, if the taxpayers in a 
district are concerned enough about education that they want to 
53. Roosevelt at 822. 
54. Id. at 825. 
55. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 at 59 (1973). 
56. Roosevelt at 825. 
57. ld. at 826. 
58. ld. 
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increase the funding for their school system, they should be 
allowed to do so. On the other hand, as is illustrated in the Roo-
sevelt case, some districts, no matter how much the taxpayers 
want to increase funding, simply do not have the tax base to do 
so-generally because of low property values. One possible re-
sult is that in a district where the assessed property value is low 
and the schools are not funded as well as in other districts, the 
location decisions of families moving into the area may change, 
possibly causing property values in the area to depreciate which 
would lower the income available to the school districts even 
more. To remedy this, the state could increase the minimum 
funding level so that the districts with the lowest funding would 
receive supplements to place them roughly at the level of the 
districts with the highest funding. There are two major prob-
lems with this idea. First, it would create a system where a race 
to the top is the only possibility, where all of the districts want 
to be in the position of the Ruth Fischer School District in the 
Roosevelt case. Second, it is possible that such a method would 
encourage districts to decrease the amount of tax revenues they 
contribute to their school district, thus requiring the state to 
pick up even more of the gap. So, in balancing the need for state-
wide equity with an interest in local autonomy, what factors can 
legitimately vary between school districts? 
The standard commonly accepted among the states results 
from the California Serrano decision. In that decision, the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court held that expenditures between school 
districts could legitimately vary according to tax effort (tax rate), 
student composition, or technological factors such as economies 
or diseconomies of scale in the production of education services. 
Expenditure variations attributable to fiscal capacity, property 
wealth, or household income were not legitimate.59 This is a 
difficult standard to implement, but that is what the courts 
seem to expect of the state legislatures. 
B. Role of Legislature in Deciding Equity Issues 
When it comes to equitable school district funding, legisla-
tures have often been required to try several different financing 
systems in an effort to find one that will solve the equity issues 
between districts to the satisfaction of the courts. The California 
59. See Serrano I. 
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Supreme Court addressed the same issue four times before the 
legislature developed a system that was satisfactory.60 The New 
Jersey Legislature tried for over three years before developing a 
system that the New Jersey Supreme Court would approve. 61 
One of the reasons for this might be that the state legislative 
process inhibits voluntary reform of the financing systems, thus 
requiring substantial legal pressure to reform the system.62 An-
other possibility might be that the compromising and negotiat-
ing required in the legislative process is not conducive to work-
ing out an equitable system between all of the districts in a 
given state. After all, legislators represent a district that gener-
ally includes no more than one or more school districts, and true 
to the nature of the representative system, they will fight for the 
interests of their district(s) more than they will for the district 
next door, or even for overall state-wide equity between dis-
tricts. The representative system is one of compromise and nego-
tiation which seldom results in an ideal solution with respect to 
issues of equity. 
Ostensibly, a search for equity might be most easily satisfied 
by absolute equality of resources-giving each district the same 
amount of money per student. However, post-Brown decisions by 
the U.S. Supreme Court have determined that absolute equality 
denies equality of educational opportunity to all children, partic-
ularly those who have disabling conditions63 or are deficient in 
speaking or writing English.64 These decisions imply that chil-
dren have the right of access to instructional programs appropri-
ate to their individual learning potentials. Hawaii, which has 
only one school district for the state, has similarly found that, 
"equal per-pupil expenditures may not generate equal educa-
tional service."65 So, in their attempts to create more equality 
between the school districts, the state legislatures have a signifi-
cant task which they may not be equipped to handle because of 
60. Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971); 557 P.2d 929 (Cal. 1976); 226 
Cal. Rptr. 584 (Cal. 1986); 763 P.2d 852 (Cal. 1988), (review denied and case sent to 
court of appeals for decision). 
61. Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273 (N.J. 1973); 306 A.2d 65 (N.J. 1973); 335 
A.2d 6 (N.J. 1975); 351 A.2d 713 (N.J. 1975); 355 A.2d 129 (N.J. 1976). 
62. Swanson, supra note 18, at 222. 
63. Mills v. Board of Education of the District of Columbia, 348 F.Supp. 866 
(1972). 
64. Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974). 
65. Fisher, supra note 3, at 385. 
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the nature of the representative system. Conversely, the court 
system, unfettered by financial considerations and by the repre-
sentative nature of its members, are not the right group to cre-
ate a solution either, as the U.S. Supreme Court indicated in the 
Rodriguez decision. 66 
C. Flux or Flaws 
Generally, state court systems can only provide the stimulus 
for reform, leaving the policy development to the legislatures. 
However, this policy frequently leads to periods of flux, or insta-
bility, while the legislatures propose various financing systems 
only to have them declared unconstitutional by the courts. In 
the Roosevelt decision, like in Serrano and Robinson,61 the court 
did not give any specific guidelines as to what would be consid-
ered constitutional in a school financing system, although the 
concurring opinion urged the court to do so. 68 Since the Roosevelt 
decision was handed down, Arizona legislators have appropri-
ated $100 million for a School Capital Equity Fund.69 In Novem-
ber 1996 the Maricopa County Superior Court ruled that the 
educational funding system in the state was still unconstitu-
tional and that the legislature had until June 30, 1998 to fix the 
system or face a school shutdown.70 In March 1997, the legisla-
ture passed an "Assistance to Build Classrooms" plan ("ABC 
plan") that the governor signed into law in March 1997. How-
ever, the Superior Court held, on August 29, 1997 that the ABC 
plan did not resolve the equity issue.71 When Governor Fife 
Symington asked the Arizona Supreme Court to declare the plan 
constitutional they let the lower court's ruling stand on October 
24, 1997.72 Because the proposed plans do not change the way 
capital funds are distributed, the judges see them as short term 
solutions, not ones that solve the problem of school district eq-
uity in Arizona. Arizona, like New Jersey between 1973 and 
1976, is in a state of flux. At what point is it better to have a 
66. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
67. Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273 (N.J. 1973); Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241 
(Cal. 1971). 
68. Roosevelt at 822. 
69. David Madrid, School-Funding Fix to Start from Scratch, THE TuCSON CITIZEN, 
October 25, 1997, at Bl. 
70. Id. 
71. Id. 
72. ld. 
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flawed system that is working to some degree than a system in 
flux for several years while the legislature attempts to find the 
best solution to the equity issue and the threat of school closure 
is continually in the air? 
V. CONCLUSION 
There are inherent difficulties in addressing school funding 
equity issues in the specific context of the Arizona case Roosevelt 
v. Bishop. While this Note does not attempt to offer a solution to 
the current situation in Arizona, it points out some of the policy 
issues the legislature is trying to address in Arizona as well as 
in other states that are currently struggling with school funding 
equity. In Roosevelt, the Arizona Supreme Court avoided ad-
dressing the issue of whether or not education is a fundamental 
right, which is a right emerging under several state constitu-
tions. However, it did find a constitutional responsibility for the 
state to produce a general and uniform financing scheme for 
public education. The difficulty with this finding, as with similar 
findings by other state supreme courts, is that there is little or 
no guidance as to what financing scheme would be constitu-
tional, leaving the legislature to flounder in the dark searching 
for something the court will know when it sees it.73 Because that 
question is so difficult to answer, the courts and the legislatures 
engage in a dance, balancing state equity interests with local 
control and funding interests, in an attempt to meet the consti-
tutional requirements of the various states. 
Hinckley A Jones-Sanpei 
73. See generally Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197, 84 S.Ct. 
1676, 1683, 12 L.Ed.2d 793 (1964) (Stewart, J. concurring) (Justice 
Stewart's famous test for obscenity- 'I know it when I see it'). 
